Justices back EBR defendant in appeal
A prosecutor cannot take advantage of a recently approved state constitutional amendment to prevent a defendant from giving up his right to a jury trial, Louisiana’s top court has ruled in a Baton Rouge case.
The state Supreme Court ruling comes 15 months after Louisiana voters approved a constitutional amendment that requires criminal defendants who wish to give up their right to a jury trial to do so at least 45 days prior to trial.
In the case of Gerald Chinn, who is awaiting trial in Baton Rouge on charges of attempted first-degree murder and felony criminal damage to property, prosecutor David deBlieux intentionally chose a trial date last year that was less than 45 days from the date it was set.
State District Judge Don Johnson set the trial on the state’s requested date but also granted Chinn’s request for a judge trial.
The East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney’s Office appealed, and the state 1st Circuit Court of Appeal reversed Johnson on the ground that Chinn could not waive his right to a jury trial less than 45 days before the scheduled trial date.
The state Supreme Court on Friday reversed the 1st Circuit and reinstated the portion of Johnson’s decision allowing Chinn to waive his right to a jury trial.
Justice John Weimer wrote for the high court that the “clear intention’’ of the drafters of the constitutional amendment was to “prevent last minute waivers by criminal defendants of the right to a jury trial.’’
“However, the constitutional provision was not enacted to deprive a defendant of the right to waive a jury trial entirely, nor was it enacted to allow the fixing of trial dates in such a manner as to deprive a defendant of the opportunity to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to a trial by jury,’’ Weimer stated.
Chinn’s trial attorney, Margaret Lagattuta, said Monday the Supreme Court “clarified for everyone the interpretation’’ of the constitutional provision.
East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney Hillar Moore III, who noted that the high court said its ruling addressed the unique facts of the Chinn case, nevertheless indicated he would advise his prosecutors not to choose trial dates inside the 45-day waiver period unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
Justice Marcus Clark, the lone dissenter, stated that the majority opinion “ignores the fact (that) the initial setting of the trial occurred almost two years after the bill of information was filed in 2009 and well after the defendant’s arraignment.’’
“In effect, the defendant could have waived his right to trial by jury at any time after charges were brought against him, including the nearly two years he waited without exercsing this right,’’ Clark wrote. “Instead, the defendant gambled his initial trial setting would be set for a future time period longer than 45 days hence. He lost that bet.’’